Strait talk: What the Hormuz crisis means for GCC markets in Q2 2026
From sovereign debt to supply chains, the region’s leading financial minds lay out where the risks are real, where the opportunities are hiding, and why the GCC has been here before
23 April, 2026
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The second quarter of 2026 arrives with the GCC navigating one of the most complex macro environments in recent memory. Geopolitical tensions that dominated Q1 have not resolved so much as reconfigured, and the question facing businesses, investors, and policymakers alike is no longer whether disruption will continue but how long it will last and what shape recovery will take.
Vijay Valecha, CFO of Century Financial, is clear that the traditional economic playbook needs updating. “Market dynamics across the GCC are being shaped less by traditional economic cycles and more by structural and logistical disruptions,“ he says.
The key macro drivers in this environment extend well beyond oil prices and interest rates to encompass trade routes, supply chain resilience, and financial system stability, a broader and more demanding set of variables than the region has had to manage simultaneously in some time.

The starting position, however, is not weak. The Central Bank of the UAE moved decisively, injecting around Dhs214bn in liquidity support and freeing up a further Dhs110bn in capital. Accompanying measures included adjustments to reserve requirements, easier access to both dirham and dollar funding, and temporary flexibility around non-performing loan classifications. The combined effect has meaningfully reduced the risk of a credit squeeze through Q2.
Tajinder Virk, Co-founder and Ceo of Finvasia Group and Dealing, points to the structural advantages the GCC brings into this period: strong external balances, substantial foreign reserves, sizeable sovereign wealth assets, world-class infrastructure, zero personal income tax environments, and access to long-term capital pools. “These reflect years of careful fiscal management that support stability during volatile times,” he says.
Both agree that the headwinds are real but manageable. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has forced GCC producers to cut oil output by around 10 million barrels per day as of mid-March, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE partially offsetting this by rerouting 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day through alternative pipelines. Brent crude trading above $100 only partially compensates for the volume loss. Meanwhile, non-oil sector momentum, central to the region’s diversification narrative, has begun to slow, with March PMI data showing growth at a four-year low.
“The non-oil sector, which has been central to the region’s diversification narrative, is beginning to lose momentum,” Valecha says. “That is a trend worth watching carefully as Q2 develops.”
Markets in motion: From panic pricing to cautious stabilisation
Despite the challenging backdrop, financial markets have entered Q2 with a striking degree of recovery. Global equities have risen more than 8 per cent from their recent lows as investors begin pricing the end of the conflict and the energy shock rather than the ongoing reality of risk. Nowhere is this resilience more visible than in the UAE, where regional markets have advanced over 13 per cent, nearly erasing war-driven losses entirely and reinforcing the country’s position as a stable capital and trade hub.
Neal Keane, head of Global Sales Trading at ADSS, says that resilience remains highly conditional on how the geopolitical situation evolves. “The UAE and broader GCC markets are entering Q2 navigating one of the most complex geopolitical backdrops in years, with the trajectory of the US-Israel-Iran crisis remaining a considerable variable for regional risk sentiment,” he says. Keane notes that each phase of the ceasefire process has directly moved local markets, while oil has mirrored that volatility. Brent surged more than 54 per cent in the first three weeks of March, climbing above $112 at the peak of the conflict before retreating as ceasefire hopes emerged. “The Strait of Hormuz remains a critical pressure point and any renewed disruption would quickly reverse recent stabilisation,” he says.
Despite that volatility, he argues the UAE’s IPO pipeline remains a major structural positive, with as many as 12 listings expected in Q2 across sectors including aviation, real estate, technology and metals. Potential listings such as Etihad Airways, Emirates Global Aluminium, Binghatti Holdings, Dubai Investment Park, Majid Al Futtaim Holding, and Dubizzle could revive issuance activity after last year’s slowdown, although Keane cautions that prolonged instability could delay deal-making. “The UAE’s structural outlook remains bullish, supported by economic diversification, robust capital depth and a solid IPO pipeline, but markets are likely to remain headline-driven in the near term.”
The turning point came after the sharp escalation in the Strait of Hormuz during Q1, when Brent crude surged from $62 to $118, one of the most significant oil price shocks in recent history. As ceasefire expectations began to emerge in Q2, oil prices eased by nearly 17 per cent, removing the immediate panic and allowing markets to stabilise. Yet the macro backdrop remains challenging. US inflation has climbed to 3.3 per cent, its fastest pace since 2005, while Eurozone inflation has moved back above the European Central Bank’s 2 per cent target. Crude oil remains elevated above $90, more than 50 per cent above its yearly lows.
Razan Hilal, market analyst and CMT at FOREX.com, frames the shift precisely. “What we are seeing now is a transition from extreme risk pricing to cautious stabilisation, where technical levels and positioning are guiding direction more than headlines.” She draws on historical patterns to support the view, noting that major geopolitical events have consistently coincided with market lows, reinforcing the principle that markets tend to discount risks ahead of time rather than after them.
Looking ahead, she expects inflation to remain elevated, central banks to stay cautious, and geopolitical tensions to remain unresolved. However, unless risks escalate materially, markets are likely to continue along their current path: stabilisation within a broader bullish structure, with intermittent volatility. Key technical thresholds will be critical in confirming this trajectory. A weekly close above 48,800 for the Dow, 25,800 for the Nasdaq, 6,920 for the S&P 500, and 21 for the MSCI UAE would reinforce expectations for new record highs.
“In a market shaped by uncertainty,” Hilal says, “price action, not headlines, is leading.”
Virk echoes the sentiment from an investor behaviour perspective. “What I tell every institutional allocator calling now is simple: markets tend to react in fear much faster than they react in resolution, and history shows what often follows.” He points to March 2020, when investors who exited early missed the recovery that followed, while those who held on built significant wealth over the subsequent 24 months. “History shows that while geopolitical events can trigger short-term instability, they rarely disrupt markets over the long term.”

The stagflation shadow
Underlying the market recovery is a more persistent and structural concern that both contributors flag as the dominant macro risk of the quarter: stagflation. The simultaneous repricing of energy, rates, and risk appetite is creating correlated volatility across asset classes rather than isolated pockets, a combination that significantly complicates both corporate planning and investment strategy.
Oil has moved from around $65 to nearly $100 per barrel. The US 10-year Treasury is approaching 4.5 per cent. Equity markets dropped nearly 10 per cent from their January peaks before the recent recovery. “We are in a situation where energy, rates, and risk appetite are being repriced simultaneously,” Virk says. “This combination leads to correlated volatility, not isolated pockets. You cannot hedge your way out of a correlated sell-off with the instruments that are also selling off.”
Valecha frames the corporate risk plainly. “The broader macro environment points towards stagflationary pressures rising globally. Rising inflation and slowing economic growth is a combination that makes every business decision harder and every planning assumption less reliable.” For the GCC specifically, where the non-oil private sector is already losing momentum, this creates a more complex policy and business environment than at any point in recent years.
Sovereign debt: Where to overweight, and where to be cautious
The GCC represents around 40 per cent of all emerging market dollar debt issuances excluding China, making the region’s sovereign credit story central to any serious institutional fixed income allocation. The outbreak of conflict has triggered a meaningful repricing, with yields on GCC US dollar sukuk and bonds reaching their widest spreads in five years. By late March, the yield to maturity on the S&P MENA Sukuk Index had climbed 69 basis points to 5.15 per cent, while the Bond Index moved 64 basis points higher to 5.37 per cent. High-yield issuances were hit hardest, with the S&P GCC High-Yield Sukuk Index expanding by 194 basis points to 7.76 per cent.
Within this environment, Valecha argues that Saudi Arabia and the UAE offer relatively better risk-adjusted opportunities, precisely because both can route oil exports around the Strait through the East-West pipeline to the Red Sea and via Fujairah port, respectively.
S&P Global recently reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s A+ rating with a stable outlook and the UAE’s AA/A-1+ sovereign credit ratings, citing strong fiscal buffers, robust external balance sheets, and sovereign wealth backing. “Opportunities in this market are specifically defined by the war’s duration, individual credit ratings, and the specific geographic and sectoral risks involved,” Valecha says. “Understanding which economies are better shielded from the Strait of Hormuz disruption is the essential first step in evaluating any risk-adjusted opportunity right now.“
The picture is considerably more challenging for GCC states without meaningful alternative export capacity. Qatar exports almost all of its LNG production through the Strait, accounting for nearly 20 per cent of global LNG exports, and attacks on the Ras Laffan complex have wiped out approximately 17 per cent of Qatar’s LNG capacity for up to five years, with direct consequences for public finances. Bahrain’s sovereign CDS spreads have widened by nearly 40 per cent since the start of the conflict, the sharpest move in the region. Iraq’s oil output has dropped from 4.2m to around 1.2m barrels per day; given that oil accounts for roughly 60 per cent of Iraq’s GDP, 90 per cent of state revenue, and 95 per cent of merchandise exports, a prolonged disruption would place serious strain on its fiscal and external positions through 2026.
Virk frames the credit opportunity in more strategic terms. “The GCC sovereign credit story remains relatively strong compared to many emerging markets, and the current environment has not changed that structural reality. Instead, it has created a more attractive entry point for those paying attention.” He notes that growing private capital allocation in the region continues to reinforce its role as a hub for investors seeking exposure to private markets and alternative assets, adding a further dimension to the investment case beyond traditional sovereign debt.
Real estate, tourism and logistics: Cyclical pain, not structural collapse
The UAE’s non-hydrocarbon sectors are bearing the most visible near-term pain. The country’s S&P Global PMI fell to 52.9 in March from 55 in February, with tourism, retail, and logistics dragging non-oil private sector activity to its slowest pace in four years. Major airlines were operating at roughly 70 per cent of normal capacity in mid-March, and Dubai hotel occupancy collapsed from a seasonal average of around 90 per cent to just 16 per cent in the final week of March, according to Lighthouse Intelligence. Oxford Economics estimates between 23m and 38m fewer visitors to the region, translating to approximately $34bn to $56bn in lost visitor spending.
Real estate is showing early signs of strain. Transaction volumes fell 37 per cent year-on-year and 49 per cent month-on-month in the first twelve days of the conflict, according to Goldman Sachs data, and some off-plan properties are being offered at discounts of 12 to 15 per cent.
The critical question is whether this pressure is structural or cyclical. Both contributors land in the same place: cyclical. “Diversifying into non-hydrocarbon sectors is critical for oil-rich countries, as it helps them achieve long-term economic stability by reducing reliance on an exhaustible resource,” Valecha says. “The current disruption is predominantly driven by geopolitics, a short-term, news-driven event. Institutional investors should not abandon the diversification thesis but recalibrate some of their exposure toward the hydrocarbon sector in the near term.” He recommends using dollar cost averaging and portfolio rebalancing to reallocate profits from energy markets into other sectors at discounted prices.
Virk goes further, arguing that the scrutiny itself is a form of validation. “The UAE’s diversification thesis is not under threat. It is being validated in real time. The level of global attention and scrutiny on the region reflects how central the UAE has become in global investment portfolios.” He draws the comparison to the Covid period, when the UAE recovered faster than most of the world through flexible policy, strong execution, and a clear focus on continuity. By the second half of 2020, tourism, retail, and real estate were already showing strong momentum; by 2021, Dubai’s real estate market was among the top performers globally. “This ability to respond, adapt, and recover quickly continues to be a defining strength of the UAE economy.”
The repositioning strategy, in his view, is not to exit but to optimise. Logistics and supply chain-linked infrastructure are attracting growing interest. Grade-A real estate continues to demonstrate long-term demand. Near-term softness in tourism and hospitality should be treated as a cyclical entry window rather than a structural exit signal.
Commodity volatility: Oil, metals, agriculture and the long tail
The conflict has made one thing sharply clear: commodity volatility does not travel in isolation. What begins as an oil shock spreads quickly to metals and agriculture, and Q2 reflects exactly this dynamic.
Oil touched $120 a barrel in March, rising approximately 50 per cent as the Strait closure was confirmed. Brent crude’s realised volatility is currently around 55 per cent, while one-month implied volatility in options markets has surged to 83 per cent, up from 46 per cent at the onset of the conflict. Precious metals initially sold off as equity markets came under pressure and investors liquidated positions to meet margin requirements, while rising inflation concerns reduced the prospects for rate cuts, historically negative for non-yielding assets.
The agricultural channel is equally significant and arguably the least discussed. Approximately a third of the global fertiliser supply moves through the Strait. Urea prices have spiked around 60 per cent, from $484 per tonne in late February to $780, according to CRU Group data. A UN Food and Agriculture Organisation index of food commodity prices rose 2.4 per cent in March, its second consecutive monthly increase. Virk flags this as a risk with a particularly long tail. “With fertiliser shipments disrupted during the Northern Hemisphere planting season, food price inflation risks are rising into 2027. This is not a Q2 story alone. Agricultural volatility has a long tail.”
On how firms should position, both contributors advocate a disciplined, asymmetric approach. “Firms dealing in crude physically should execute tight hedges using options rather than just having a naked exposure,” Valecha says. “Real-time and dynamic rebalancing is also necessary in such an environment. This will help protect against any large spikes or increase in volatility.” He also recommends maintaining a strategic inventory of critical inputs and diversifying supply chains as a parallel line of defence. Virk makes the case for options over futures specifically because of the asymmetry they provide. “If you hedge the base case with futures, you lock in the high prices and sacrifice your upside on normalisation. Options give you asymmetry — protection against the downside while keeping you in the game for the recovery. Firms that over-hedge at current prices will likely fall short during the rebound.”
Both also point to early ceasefire signals as a meaningful input for forward pricing. Goldman Sachs estimates that if Hormuz flows recover within a month, oil prices could average $71 per barrel in Q4 2026. As Virk notes, the market will begin pricing that resolution scenario before any formal announcement is made. It always does.
Operational resilience: What companies on the ground are doing
The response at the company level is already differentiating the prepared from the reactive. Spinneys has rerouted shipments through ports west of the Strait, absorbing higher logistics costs rather than passing them on to customers, clearly prioritising long-term relationships over short-term margins. ADNOC Gas has maintained that operations are largely running as planned despite some export-side adjustments. AD Ports Group is keeping its network operational while acknowledging that vessel traffic is likely to ease in the near term. Du and First Abu Dhabi Bank have both communicated operational and financial stability to their stakeholders.
“For businesses that rely heavily on imports, the focus now is on preparing for a scenario where Hormuz remains constrained for 45 to 60 days,” Valecha says. “That means putting supply chains under pressure tests, looking at alternative routing options, and building up inventory buffers wherever it is practical.” He points to hubs including Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Jeddah, and India as alternatives already being used by non-listed firms, and suggests listed players may increasingly need to follow. “A disruption of this scale requires decisions to be made in real time, not just reliance on contingency plans.”
Across sectors, the impact is uneven. Aviation and tourism are under the most acute pressure. Banks are holding up reasonably well, supported by strong liquidity and policy measures, though asset quality may come into focus if the disruption extends. Stocks like Emaar and Aldar have corrected, but underlying real estate demand remains largely intact, and much depends on the duration of the current environment.
Decision quality over market access
One of the more distinctive observations to emerge from Q2 is a shift in what sophisticated investors are actually asking for. Virk notes that as markets become more complex, the focus is shifting from access to decision quality. “Investors today want convenience, but they also want confidence,” he says. “Bridging that gap is where platforms can add real value.” For Dealing, the opportunity lies in helping investors move beyond simple market access toward better idea discovery, clearer opportunity comparison, and more informed decision-making, a capability gap that periods of high volatility tend to expose most visibly.
This theme resonates with Hilal’s reading on market behaviour. In an environment where technical levels and positioning are driving direction more than headlines, the quality of analytical frameworks matters as much as the underlying data. Investors who can distinguish between signal and noise, between structural damage and cyclical disruption, are the ones best positioned to act when the recovery accelerates.
The key message for Q2
The outlook from all three contributors converges on a single principle: flexibility is the most valuable asset a company or investor can hold right now. “The UAE and the broader GCC still rest on strong fundamentals, but a disruption of this scale requires decisions to be made in real time,” Valecha says. “Companies that remain flexible, communicate transparently, and focus on staying resilient are likely to be in a stronger position once things begin to settle down.”
Virk’s framing is sharper and perhaps the most useful note on which to close. “Do not confuse volatility with structural damage. The Strait of Hormuz has never been permanently closed because the global economy simply cannot afford it. The incentives for every major power to restore transit are strong and aligned.” His read on history is direct: periods of uncertainty have consistently created long-term opportunities for disciplined investors. The GCC, he argues, has repeatedly demonstrated that it recovers faster than the rest of the world. There is no structural reason to believe this time is different.
The key risk to monitor is duration. “A key macro risk to watch is the conflict extending beyond the next 45 to 60 days,” Valecha says. “A prolonged disruption would materially amplify pressures on trade routes, supply chains, and investor confidence, shifting the impact from a temporary shock to a more structural challenge.”
That challenge, all three contributors insist, is manageable. The test now is execution under pressure, and on that measure, the region’s track record provides reasonable grounds for confidence.















